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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had defaulted on
loans secured by real property and the mortgage had been
foreclosed and the property sold. The period of redemption
had expired and all that was left to complete the transfer of
title was a judicial confirmation of the sale. Before this
could occur, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The court held
that the automatic stay barred the judicial confirmation of
the sale until the creditor obtained relief from the automatic
stay. U.S. v. Molitor, 157 B.R. 427 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3]*
ANNUITY. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
sold some non-exempt assets and purchased three annuity
contracts. The debtor claimed the three contracts as exempt
under Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.100(c). The court held
that the annuity contracts were not eligible for the
exemption because the annuities did not represent benefit
payments from matured life insurance policies. In re
Pikush, 157 B.R. 155 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption under Section 522(f) and sought to avoid judicial
liens which impaired the exemption. The liens against the
house included a first priority unavoidable mortgage, four
next priority judicial liens and a sixth priority unavoidable
tax lien. The total of the liens substantially exceeded the
value of the house. The creditor argued that because the first
and sixth priority liens were unavoidable and exceeded the
value of the house, the judicial liens did not impair the
exemption. The court held that the impairment occurred
when the liens, taken in order of priority, first exceeded the
value of the house less the exemption amount; however, the
impairment only affected the priority of the liens by placing
the debtor’s exemption amount in the priority scheme.
Because the IRS lien could not be affected by the change in
priority, the last judicial lien was bifurcated into a seventh
priority portion equal to the exemption amount. The affect
of this solution is that (1) no actual avoidance of a lien
occurs but the debtor receives the exemption amount upon
sale of the collateral and (2) the lien which caused the total
of liens to exceed the value of the exempt property less the
exemption amount became unsecured by the exemption
amount. In re Bellenoit, 157 B.R. 185 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1992).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor had claimed a homestead
exemption under Cal. Code of Civil Proc. § 703.140. The
trustee objected to the exemption because the bankruptcy
case was not an attempt to sell the residence to enforce a
money judgment. The court held that because the
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the status as hypothetical
creditor, the exemption was allowed in a bankruptcy case.
In re Norman, 157 B.R. 460 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1993).
IRA. The debtor opened an IRA in 1987 and filed for
bankruptcy in 1992, claiming the IRA as exempt. The
debtor was 45 years old and was facing unemployment due
to a shutdown of the company for which the debtor worked.
The court found that the debtor’s income just exceeded the
debtor’s expenses but after unemployment, the expenses
would exceed income. However, because the debtor had
never made withdrawals from the IRA and that
demonstrated that the debtor did not need all of the account
for living expenses, the court held that half of the account
must be turned over to the trustee. The court also ordered
the debtor and trustee to share in the cost of the federal
taxes and penalties resulting from the early withdrawal from
the IRS. In re Metzner, 157 B.R. 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993).
The debtor owned two IRA’s, one for $2,000 and one
for $5,500, which the debtor claimed as exempt. The debtor
was 58 years old and on medical leave for stress. The debtor
was planning to separate from her spouse and was under a
threat of losing her job. The debtor had more debt payments
and personal expenses than would be covered by payments
from the IRAs. The court held that only the $2,000 IRA was
not reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support and not
exempt. The debtor was required to pay any taxes and
penalties resulting from the early withdrawal of funds from
the IRA. In re Bogart, 157 B.R. 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor claimed real property as
exempt in the bankruptcy petition in April 1992 but did not
provide any statutory basis for the exemption. In September
1992, the debtor amended the exemption schedules to
include an automobile but did not otherwise amend the
exemptions. The trustee filed an objection to the real
property exemption in September 1992, arguing that the
objection should be allowed because it was made within 30
days after an amendment to the exemptions. The court held
that the objection was untimely because the amendment did
not change the exemption claim for the real property. The
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court also held that the lack of identification of the statutory
basis for the exemption did not affect the validity of the
exemption once the time limit for objections had expired.
In re Hickman, 157 B.R. 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
STOCK. Holdings such as in In re Hickman, supra  have
apparently led to the practice of “exemption by declaration”
wherein debtors claim nonexempt property as exempt in the
hope that the trustee or creditors will fail to timely object,
thus creating an exemption where none was otherwise
allowed. In the present case, the debtor claimed $1,192
worth of stock as exempt under the Indiana exemption for
tangible personal property. The court held that the stock
was clearly intangible property and the claim of the
exemption was an attempt to create an exemption by
declaration. In an attempt to discourage future false
exemption claims, the court disallowed all of the stock as
exempt, including the portion which would have been
exempt under the intangible personal property exemption,
and charged the bankruptcy estate’s legal fees to the debtor.
Matter of Slentz, 157 B.R. 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8]*
DISMISSAL. The debtors filed a Chapter 12 petition
and later filed to dismiss the petition. A creditor objected to
the dismissal and reinstatement of the petition was ordered.
The debtors appealed that decision. During the pendency of
that appeal, the case was converted to Chapter 7 and all
assets distributed to creditors without objection by the
debtors. The court held that the appeal of the reinstatement
decision was dismissed as moot. In re Roller, 999 F.2d 346
(8th Cir. 1993).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtor owned farm land and had
operated the farm for several years until the debtor’s spouse
formed a corporation to operate the farm. The debtor rented
the land to the corporation and was employed by the
corporation to drive trucks. The corporation provided the
working capital for the farm operation, employed the debtor
to operate the farm and paid cash rent to the debtor for use
of the farm land. The corporation also paid cash rent to the
debtor for the farm office and use of the debtor’s machinery
shop. Creditors objected to the debtor’s eligibility for
Chapter 12 because less than 50 percent of the debtor’s
income came from farming. The court rejected the test of In
re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 925 (1987) requiring farm income to come from
activities in which the debtor was at risk, thus eliminating
wages from farm income for purposes of eligibility for
Chapter 12. Instead, the court followed the dissent in
Armstrong and used an all facts and circumstances test as to
whether the debtor’s wages from farming should be
considered farm income. In the present case, the court held
that the wages and rent payments were farm income
because the debtor’s involvement in the farm only changed
its form by the use of the corporation and that in substance,
the debtor still operated the farm. In re Creviston, 157 B.R.
380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
    CHAPTER 13
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[5].* The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan
provided for payments on loans secured by two pickups.
The plan reduced the loan principal to the value of the
vehicles and reduced the interest rate to 10 percent. The
lower courts held that the prime rate was the guide for
determining the adequacy of the interest rate on deferred
payments on secured claims. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the interest rate should be determined by the
interest rate charged by the creditor for similar loans. The
court rejected the prime rate as an adequate interest rate
because the “cost of funds” approach to the interest rate did
not account for additional costs to the creditor from
administering the plan payments. The court treated the
deferred payments as a coerced loan which entitled the
creditor to receive the amount of interest it normally
charges for similar loans. In remanding the case, the court
noted that the contract interest rate was a good indication of
the normal interest rate charged by the creditor. Thus, it
appears that the court sanctions using the “contract rate” as
the standard for interest rates on deferred Chapter 13 plan
payments unless the debtor can demonstrate that the
creditor is currently charging less for “coerced” loans.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63
(3d Cir. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7]*
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtors had listed their
federal income tax liability as a claim in their bankruptcy
case and the IRS received notice of the case. The confirmed
plan provided for payment of the tax claim outside of the
plan.  Eight months after the confirmation, the IRS sent the
debtors a notice of intent to levy for the taxes in the claim.
The debtors claimed that the levy notice violated the
automatic stay and filed for an injunction and costs,
including attorney’s fees. The IRS did not claim sovereign
immunity but claimed that damages were awardable only
under I.R.C. § 7430. The court held that the debtors were
entitled to an injunction and costs under Section 362(h)
because the IRS had filed a claim in the case. In re
Boldman, 157 B.R. 412 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 147 B.R.
448 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
CLAIMS. The debtor’s schedules listed the IRS as
holding a priority tax claim but did not include the IRS in
the list of creditors; therefore, the IRS did not receive notice
of the bankruptcy filing. The debtor also did not file a claim
for the tax claim until over 21 months after the bar date for
claims. The court noted that if the IRS claim was allowed,
that claim would take all of the bankruptcy estate and leave
nothing for the unsecured creditors.  In addition, the tax
claim was nondischargeable. The court held that the
untimely claim would not be allowed. In re Mosely, 157
B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was a shareholder in an S
corporation. The tax matters partner had signed an
agreement to waive until November 1990 the limitation
period on federal tax assessments for the corporation’s 1983
tax year. The debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in
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September 1990 and argued that the debtor’s share of any
additional tax assessed against the S corporation was
dischargeable. The court held that the additional assessment
was nondischargeable because at the time of the filing of
the petition, the waiver agreement was still in effect and the
IRS had time to make the assessment but for the filing of
the bankruptcy case which stayed the assessment as to the
debtor. In re Anderson, 157 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993).
NONDEBTOR RIGHTS. The debtor and nondebtor
spouse had filed joint federal income tax returns for 1988,
1989, and 1990 and the debtor included the tax claims for
those years in the debtor’s plan. The IRS levied against the
nondebtor’s wages and the debtor sought to enjoin the IRS
collection efforts against the nondebtor spouse under
Section 1301. The court held that Section 1301 applied only
to collection of consumer debts and not taxes. Matter of
Greene, 157 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993).
POST-CONFIRMATION INTEREST. The IRS had
filed a claim which included pre-petition tax and interest.
The claim was disputed and appealed until the U.S.
Supreme court denied certiorari of a ruling allowing the
claim. The debtor’s plan provided payment of all allowed
claims on the later of the plan effective date or the date the
claims became allowed. The IRS argued that because the
claim could not be paid under the plan until the final appeal
was exhausted, the payment of the claim was a deferred
payment and the IRS was entitled to post-confirmation
interest under Section 1129(a)(9)(C). The court held that the
delay caused by the appeals did not make the payment
deferred where the plan provided for immediate payment
when the claim became allowed. In re White Farm
Equipment, Co., 157 B.R. 117 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 146
B.R. 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
PRIORITY. The debtor had filed two Chapter 11 cases
with the plan confirmed in the first case. The IRS had filed
claims in the first case and before the second case made
several post-confirmation assessments of the same claims
and for additional taxes. Two state taxing agencies made
assessments during the first bankruptcy case and several
assessments before the second case.  The parties sought a
determination of the priority of the various assessments.
The court held that the IRS assessments relating to the
claims included in the first bankruptcy case were ineffective
to change their discharge status determined under the plan.
The state assessments made during the first bankruptcy case
were void for violation of the automatic stay. The remaining
assessments had priority based on the date of the assessment
and not the date the liens for the assessments were filed. In
re W.F. Monroe Cigar Co., 157 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DISASTER PROGRAM. The CCC has adopted as
final amendments to the Disaster Payment Program and
Tree Assistance Program regulations to add provisions for
the 1993 programs. 58 Fed. Reg. 51757 (Oct. 5, 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has
adopted as final regulations requiring safe handling
instructions on all raw meat and poultry product labels. The
handling instructions are to include a rationale statement
and instructions for safe storage of raw products, prevention
of cross-contamination, cooking, and handling of leftovers.
58 Fed. Reg. 52856 (Oct. 12, 1993).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT-ALM § 9.05.*
The respondent was president of an unregistered livestock
market agency. Although the respondent was not aware of
the scheme, one of the respondent’s customers used a check
kiting scheme involving the respondent’s agency to
purchase cattle. When the plan fell through, the
respondent’s agency was left insolvent. The ALJ ruled that
although the respondent did not perpetrate the check kiting
scheme, the respondent’s consent to the purchases was a
willful violation of 7 U.S.C. § 213(a). The respondent was
suspended from operating for one year. In re Cedar Vale
Sale Barn, Inc., 52 Agric. Dec. 546 (1993).
The respondents were officers and owners of a posted
stockyard. Audits of the respondents’ custodial accounts
found several occasions when the custodial accounts were
short due to the failure by the respondents to timely deposit
consignors’ proceeds from the consignment sale of
livestock and for purchases made by the respondents’
stockyard. Although no checks to consignors were
dishonored for insufficient funds, the shortages were held to
be violations of 7 U.S.C. §§ 208, 213(a). The respondents’
registration was suspended for the greater of 21 days or
until the custodial account shortages were removed. In re
Fowler Livestock Auction, Inc., 52 Agric. Dec. 558
(1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE-ALM § 5.04.*  The
decedent made several gifts of money to the decedent's
children who transferred the money back to the decedent in
exchange for a non-interest bearing note payable in 25 years
or upon the death of the decedent.  The decedent reported
the gifts on federal gift tax returns.  The court held that the
estate could not deduct the notes as claims against the estate
because the notes did not represent bona fide debts
contracted for full and adequate consideration.  Est. of
Flandreau v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,137 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g,  T.C. Memo. 1992-173.
DISCLAIMER. The decedent died intestate and was
survived by a spouse and children.  Under intestate
succession, the surviving spouse was entitled to $20,000
and one-half of the remaining estate, with the other half
passing to the children. The surviving spouse filed a written
disclaimer of a pecuniary amount of the spouse’s share of
the estate equal to the amount which would fully use the
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decedent’s unified credit. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer
would be effective. Ltr. Rul. 9338010, June 21, 1993.
GIFTS-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer was a shareholder
in a family-owned dairy corporation. On December 31,
1983, the taxpayer wrote a check to each of four children.
The checks were endorsed for deposit on January 10, 1984.
The taxpayer argued that the checks should be considered
1983 gifts because of the relation-back doctrine for checks
delivered to donees. The IRS argued that the relation-back
doctrine applied only to charitable gifts. The court noted
that the relation-back doctrine was available to
noncharitable gifts under Est. of Metzger v. Comm’r, 100
T.C. 204 (1993), but held that Metzger would not be applied
because no evidence was presented that the taxpayer had
sufficient funds in the checking account to cover the checks
on December 31, 1983. W.H. Braun Family Partnership
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-434.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.*  The decedent was a
life beneficiary of a trust established by a predeceased
spouse. The trust provided that trust income and corpus
could only be distributed to the decedent and only for the
decedent’s care, support, maintenance and comfort. The
decedent had agreed to allow the trustees to make annual
gifts to other family members in amounts just under the
annual exclusion amount. The IRS ruled that the gifts were
included in the decedent’s gross estate because the trustees
had no power to make the distributions, even with the
decedent’s consent. The IRS ruled that the making of gifts
for family estate planning purposes was not an enumerated
purpose for distributions from the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9337001,
May 17, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will provided for property passing to the
surviving spouse in trust. The trust was funded with as
much property as necessary to reduce the decedent’s federal
estate tax to the lowest amount possible.  A QTIP election
was made for the trust, with a reverse QTIP election made
for part of the trust equal to the decedent’s unused GSTT
exemption amount. The will provided that any death taxes
incurred by the death of the surviving spouse and directly
attributable to the trust were to be paid from the portion of
the trust for which the reverse QTIP election was not made.
Allocation of trust assets to the two portions was based on
the fair market value of the assets on the date of distribution
of estate assets to the trust.  The IRS ruled that the trust was
eligible for a partial reverse QTIP election and that the
surviving spouse’s right of recovery of taxes resulting from
the QTIP portion of the trust did not affect the decedent’s
status as transferor of the reverse QTIP portion of the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9337006, June 14, 1993.
RESULTING TRUST. The decedent was a life
beneficiary of a trust established in 1970 by the decedent’s
sister. The independent trustee improperly transferred the
trust corpus, stock, to the decedent’s stock brokerage
account without the decedent’s knowledge. Once the
decedent learned about the transfer, the decedent kept the
stock separate and only took the net income from the stock.
The decedent had made plans to transfer the stock to
another trust but died before the transfer was completed.
The IRS ruled that the decedent held the stock in a resulting
trust under state law and would not be considered as owning
the stock; therefore, the stock was not included in the
decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9338011, June 22, 1993.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that the August
1993 revisions of Form 706 and Form 706-NA are
available. The IRS also stated that because of the retroactive
application of the OBRA 1993 reinstatement of the 53
percent estate and gift tax rate for cumulative taxable
transfers over $2.5 million and 55 percent for transfers over
$3 million, the estates which used the February 1993 Form
706 and March 1993 version of Form 706-NA may be liable
for additional tax.  The IRS will review these returns and
assess the additional tax or the estates may lessen the
interest by filing amended returns promptly. Ann. 93-122,
I.R.B. 1993-31.
VALUATION. After the decedent had been diagnosed
for cancer with less than a 5 percent chance of recovery, the
decedent amended two family partnership agreements to
allow the transfer of partnership interests and to have the
decedent’s son made managing partner at the decedent’s
death. The decedent transferred remainder interests in the
decedent’s partnership interests to trusts for the decedent’s
children in exchange for $250,000 and annuities payable
over the decedent’s life.  The remainder interests were
valued using the actuarial tables of Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-
5(f) (Table A) for a person of the decedent’s age. The
annuity agreement had a provision that the remainder
interest purchasers agreed to increase the amount to be paid
if the remainder interests were revalued by the IRS or Tax
Court. The court held that the remainder interests could not
be valued using the actuarial table because of the limited
life expectancy of the decedent. The savings clause was not
effective to change the fact that the purchasers had paid less
than fair market value for the remainder interests and that,
therefore, the transfers were includible in the decedent’s
estate as gifts under I.R.C. § 2036 but offset by the
$250,000 actually paid. Est. of McLendon v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-459.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
COMPENSATION. The taxpayer, the president of a
closely held corporation, claimed that payments from the
corporation were repayments of a loan made to the
corporation. The court held that the payments were included
in the taxpayer’s gross income because no corporate records
were produced which showed the money paid to the
corporation by the president was treated as an obligation of
the corporation or that the payments were made on a loan.
Rogers v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-444.
NET OPERATING LOSS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations relating to the segregation of public groups
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following stock issuances for purposes of determining
whether an ownership change has occurred under I.R.C. §
382. The regulations also provide exceptions to the
segregation rules in the temporary regulations.  58 Fed.
Reg. 51571 (Oct. 4, 1993).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer had filed a suit against a former employer for sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a common law tort, and breach of
contract. The jury awarded the taxpayer $70,000 in
compensatory damages and $70,000 in punitive damages on
the claim for sex discrimination and sexual harassment,
$70,000 in compensatory and $30,000 in punitive damages
on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional stress,
and $10,000 for the breach of contract. The plaintiff also
received costs and attorney’s fees. The court held that the
$100,000 in punitive damages was included in the
taxpayer’s gross income because the awards were intended
as punishment and not as compensation for injury to the
taxpayer. Reese v. U.S., 28 Fed. Cl. 702 (1993).
HOME OFFICE . The taxpayer was a self-employed
painter who mostly painted gas stations. The court held that
the taxpayer was not allowed deductions for expenses
relating to a home office because the taxpayer spent most of
the business time painting and the home office could not be
considered the principal place of business. Coutsoubelis v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-457.
The taxpayer was a professor of finance who claimed
deductions for expenses related to investment management
activities, including a home office. The court held that the
investment management activity was not an active trade or
business because the lack of current or prospective clients
indicated that the activity was not regularly conducted. The
court also disallowed the home office deductions because
I.R.C. § 280A specifically disallows such deductions for
investment activities. Bendetovitch v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-443.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayers had investment interest in excess of $10,000 plus
investment income and carried the interest disallowed by
I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) over to later taxable years until sufficient
investment income was available to allow all of the interest
as a deduction. The IRS argued that the carried-over interest
could not be carried over in subsequent tax years in which
the taxpayers’ income did not exceed the carried-over
interest, because the carried-over interest was not allowable
as a deduction in those years solely by operation of I.R.C. §
163(d)(1). The Tax Court held that its prior decision in
Beyer v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1304 (1989), rev’d, 916 F.2d 153
(4th Cir. 1990) in favor of the IRS position was incorrect
and held that the disallowed investment interest could be
carried over without regard to the amount of taxable income
in subsequent carryover taxable years. Lenz v. Comm’r,
101 T.C. No. 17 (1993).
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03.*  The
taxpayer was a partner in a partnership which sold a
building in an installment sale. The partnership reported
short term capital gain under the installment method on
Form 6252 accompanying Form K-1 for the partners. The
court held that the taxpayer could not elect out of the
installment method of reporting income from the sale
because not all of the gain was reported by the partnership
for the return for the year of sale. Est. of Wilkinson v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-463.
IRA. The taxpayer owned an IRA and was assessed the
100 percent penalty as a responsible person for failure of
the taxpayer’s company to pay federal employment taxes.
The IRS levied against the IRA and the trust company paid
the IRA funds to the IRS in partial satisfaction of the
penalty. The court held that the taxpayer was liable for the
early withdrawal penalty even though the funds were not
paid to the taxpayer. Pilipski v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-461.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayer
was a tax matters partner (TMP) for a limited partnership.
The taxpayer filed a timely individual income tax return for
1984. In 1988, the IRS filed with the taxpayer a Notice of
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) which
stated that additional taxes would be due by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer signed a Form 870-P agreement to waive the
restrictions on assessments resulting from the FPAA and
paid the taxpayer’s share of additional tax resulting from the
FPAA. However, other partners contested the FPAA in the
Tax Court resulting in the IRS conceding to drop the
additional assessments against the partnership. The taxpayer
filed for a refund of the additional taxes paid and brought
suit to force the IRS to make the refund. The court held that
the waiver agreement was valid and that the refund was
barred by the agreement clause in which the taxpayer
agreed not to seek a refund unless the taxpayer claimed
fraud, malfeasance or misrepresentation by the IRS.
Because the taxpayer made no claim of fraud, malfeasance
or misrepresentation by the IRS, the refund was denied.
Alexander v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,536
(N.D. Tex. 1993).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued procedures for
notifying the IRS that a taxpayer treats businesses as
separate lines of business under I.R.C. § 414(r). Rev. Proc.
94-40, I.R.B. 1993-31.
The IRS has issued procedures for requesting a
determination that a business meets administrative scrutiny
as a separate line of business. Rev. Proc. 94-41, I.R.B.
1993-31.
The IRS has issued procedures which provide guidelines
for simplifying the process of substantiating compliance
with the nondiscrimination provisions of I.R.C. §§
401(a)(4), 410(b):
• Employers who do not have precise data available at
reasonable cost may substantiate compliance with the
nondiscrimination requirements using reliable substitute
data.
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• Employers may substantiate compliance with the
nondiscrimination requirements using “snapshot” testing on
a single representative day.
• Employers may use a simplified method for
determining highly compensated employees.
• Employers will not be required to test a plan more than
once every three years provided there is no significant
change.
• Plan administrators will be able to rely on appropriate,
employer-provided information.
• Employers may use many of these substantiation
guidelines to demonstrate that they are operating qualified
separate lines of business.
Rev. Proc. 94-42, I.R.B. 1993-31.
RENT DEDUCTION. The taxpayer sold several pieces
of real property to various foreign entities established by the
taxpayers and leased the properties back to themselves. The
court held that the taxpayers would not be allowed
deductions for rent paid to the entities because the
transactions were shams in that the taxpayers retained
control over the properties. Bodor v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-456.
A corporation was allowed deductions for rent paid to a
sole shareholder and to a partnership composed of members
of the shareholder’s family, where the rent paid was not
excessive.  W.H. Braun Family Partnership v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-434.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a review of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 changes in tax law for
corporations.  Ann. 93-133, I.R.B. 1993-32.
The IRS has issued guidance for high income individual
taxpayers who have additional income tax liability for 1993
resulting from retroactive changes made by the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993. The notice also provides
guidance on making the election to pay the additional taxes
in three installments, including estimating the first
installment if the 1993 total is not known. Notice 93-51,
I.R.B. 1993-33.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The taxpayers filed a timely 1988 S
corporation election but failed to provide two items for
shareholders’ consent to the election. The election was
returned and refiled 15 days late for 1988 and still lacked
one consent item. The IRS accepted the election for 1989
and allowed an extension for filing the missing information.
The taxpayer argued that the IRS acceptance should apply
to the 1988 election and not to 1989 because a clerical error
had used 1989 instead of 1988 in the election application.
The court held that the election could not apply to 1988
because it was not completely and timely filed in the first
place and the clerical error could not be disregarded because
the election requirements must be strictly met for a valid
election for a certain taxable year. Garrett & Garrett, P.C.
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-453.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer formed an irrevocable trust
funded with S corporation stock. The trust provided for
annuity payments to the taxpayer’s sisters and discretionary
payments to the taxpayer’s children. Upon the taxpayer’s
death, the trust passed to the taxpayer’s children. No
distribution could be made in discharge of the taxpayer’s
legal obligations to a beneficiary. The taxpayer had the right
to substitute property of equal value to the trust property.
The IRS ruled that a determination as to whether the
taxpayer would be taxed as the owner of the trust property
had to be deferred until examination of the income tax
returns of the parties involved to determine whether the
taxpayer had a nonfiduciary power of administration over
the trust. The IRS also ruled that the trust was an eligible
Subchapter S trust with the taxpayer considered the owner
of the stock. Ltr. Rul. 9337011, June 17, 1993.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, a tax consultant and spouse,
transferred their businesses to three business trusts. The
court held that the income from the trusts was taxable to the
taxpayers as self-employment income because the taxpayers
failed to provide any evidence that the organizations were
formed for a valid reason except to produce tax deductions
and to avoid self-employment tax. Wilbur v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-442.
NEGLIGENCE
EMPLOYER LIABILITY. The plaintiff was a farm
laborer who was injured while hooking a rotovator tiller
owned by the defendant to a tractor owned by the plaintiff’s
employer. The plaintiff was on the defendant’s land at the
time of the accident. The plaintiff did not present any
evidence that the defendant employed the plaintiff or
authorized the plaintiff to act on the defendant’s behalf. No
evidence was presented that the defendant controlled the
plaintiff’s labor activities. The court held that the defendant
was entitled to summary judgment as to liability as an
employer under respondeat superior because the plaintiff
failed to show an employment relationship between the
parties.  In addition, the court held that the defendant’s
ownership of the land was not a sufficient basis for
imposition of liability. Gaskins v. Gaona, 433 S.E.2d 408
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
VETERINARIANS
EXPERT TESTIMONY. The plaintiff was the owner
of a black mare which was admitted to the defendant’s care
for treatment of an injury to the mare’s hind leg. A black
stallion was also admitted to the defendant’s care for
removal of chips from the stallion’s front leg. The
defendant operated on the wrong horse and the owner of the
mare sued for malpractice. After the plaintiff indicated that
no expert testimony would be presented, the defendant
moved for dismissal, arguing that expert testimony was
required by N.H. Rev. Stat. § 507-E:2 to prove medical
negligence. The plaintiff argued that operation on the wrong
horse was sufficient evidence of negligence and that the
statute applied only to cases of injury to humans. The court
agreed with the plaintiff but held that expert testimony
would be required to prove that the actions of the defendant
caused the injury claimed by the plaintiff. Because the case
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was one of first impression, the plaintiff was allowed to
designate an expert witness for trial. Durocher v.
Rochester Equine Clinic, 629 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 5444
MADISON, WI 53705-5444
172
WATER
ABANDONMENT. The plaintiff owned a junior
ground water right to wells in the Red aquifer and
petitioned for abandonment of the water rights of five other
wells in the same aquifer. Under Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-104, a
petition for abandonment of another’s water rights must
show a benefit to the petitioner resulting from the
abandonment. The plaintiff argued that although it had not
demonstrated any specific water use benefit, the
abandonment of the wells would produce a benefit in that
the relative priority of the plaintiff’s water rights in the
aquifer would increase. The court held that the benefit
claimed by the plaintiff was insufficient to give the plaintiff
standing to petition for abandonment of the five wells. Joe
Johnson Co. v. Wyo. State Bd. of Control, 857 P.2d 312
(Wyo. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Wells Fargo Bank v. U.S., 1 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 1993),
aff’g, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,067 (C.D. Cal.
1991) (charitable deduction) see p. 145 supra.
Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Indus., Inc.,
113 S.Ct. 2006 (1993), rev’g, 951 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1992)
(pension plans) see p. 99 supra.  Case remanded to Tax
Court, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,533 (5th Cir.
1993).
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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